Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud by Miest, Ryan G.




Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The
Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud
Ryan G. Miest
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Miest, Ryan G., "Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on
Pleading Securities Fraud" (1998). Minnesota Law Review. 2291.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2291
Note
Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up:
The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud
Ryan G. Miest*
Few issues divide the legal and business communities as
vehemently as class action securities fraud suits. Corporate in-
terest groups-primarily high technology companies, accounting
firms, and securities underwriters'-characterize such lawsuits
as an unwarranted "litigation tax."2 These groups contend that
most securities fraud claims are brought to extort settlements
which primarily benefit attorneys? By contrast, consumer inter-
est groups, including plaintiffs lawyers, senior citizen organiza-
tions, and small investor groups,4 argue that private securities
fraud litigation is necessary to protect investors from unscrupu-
lous corporate actions.' The political showdown between these
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; B.BA_
1995, University of Iowa.
L See Timothy R. Donovan, New Private Securities Lawsuit Reforms,
CORP. BOARD, Mar., 1996, at 10.
2. See Bruce Rubenstein, Cease and Desist, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
1994, at 40.
3. One commentator succinctly summarized the business community's
view of private securities fraud litigation:
There is probably no other area of the law so rife with attorney abuse
as federal securities law.
[Strike suits] represent everything Americans hate about our le-
gal system; professional plaintiffs, fishing expeditions with boiler-
plate accusations of fraud, contingency-fee lawyers who make a huge
profit even when the case does not reach trial, and multimillion-
dollar settlements that reward the lawyers and resemble legal
blackmail.
Louis M. Thompson Jr., Legal Reform Overdue for Securities Litigation Sys-
tem, HOUSTON BUS. J., May 26, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5873787.
4 See Donovan, supra note 1, at 10.
5. See Amy Neeno, House Passes Securities Litigation Reform; Bill
Heads to White House, WEST's LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 13, 1995, available in 1995
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groups is a high-stakes battle: between 1988 and 1993, publicly
traded companies paid $2.5 billion to settle securities fraud
claims.'
Securities fraud litigation helps to ensure the accuracy of
investment information, which in turn results in properly valued
securities and maximizes the efficiency of capital markets.7
However, private securities fraud litigation is also particularly
vulnerable to abuse because the massive legal costs a defendant
corporation incurs in defending a securities fraud suit typically
outweigh the value of the settlement which can be negotiated?
Therefore, a plaintiff who can keep his or her claim alive until
discovery is virtually assured a settlement:9 motions on the
WL 907529. Because the Securities Exchange Commission lacks the re-
sources to prosecute all violations of securities fraud laws, such claims also
serve the public by providing additional deterrence to corporations. See Con-
cerning the Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Arthur'Levitt,
Chairman, SEC), available in 1997 WL 11235194. Proponents of private se-
curities fraud litigation argue that this function is increasingly indispensable
in an era where the average American is more likely to have invested in the
stock market, either through mutual fids or 401(k) plans. See Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Leonard B. Simon, attorney), avail-
able in 1997 WL 11235199.
6. See Donovan, supra note 1, at 6. The dominant plaintiffs firm Mil-
berg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, LLP has won more than $1 billion dol-
lars in settlements. See Pamela Sherrid, The General Custer of Shareholder
Lawsuits? How One Lawyer Helps Thwart Legal Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Apr. 21, 1997, at 66-67.
7. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Se-
curities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1
(1982) (providing a framework for analyzing whether investors suffered any
injury as a result of an alleged misrepresentation or nondisclosure).
8. See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993)
("[T]here is the interest in deterring the use of the litigation process as a de-
vice for extracting undeserved settlements as the price of avoiding the exten-
sive discovery costs that frequently ensue once a complaint survives dis-
missal, even though no recovery would occur if the suit were litigated to
completion."). Discovery costs account for approximately 80% of the costs of
litigation in securities fraud cases. See Donovan, supra note 1, at 7. Some
commentators argue that the settlements in Rule 10b-5 cases bear "little or no
relationship to the merits of the plaintiffs' claims." See Barbara Moses, Secu-
rities Litigation Reformed?, 29 REV. SEC. & COMMODnTIES REG. 37, 37 (1996).
But see Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grund-
fest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Actions Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority", 108 HARV. L. REv. 438, 448-49 (1994)
(claiming the existence of a relationship between the merits of a private liti-
gation code under federal securities law and its settlement value).
9. By one estimate, less than one percent of cases go to trial. See Jordan
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pleadings are thus the most significant contest in any securities
fraud claim.'"
To state a claim for relief for securities fraud, a plaintiff
must allege that the defendant acted with scienter, which is
typically the most difficult element of a securities fraud claim to
plead." Scienter is defined as knowledge on the part of one mak-
ing a representation, at the time the statement was made, that it
was false.'2 Thus, a plaintiff must allege that the false statements
that are the basis of his claim were known by the defendant to
be false when made, which usually requires some type of circum-
stantial evidence since direct evidence of a defendant's state of
mind is almost nonexistent prior to discovery.'3 The ability to ef-
fectively plead scienter often means the difference between dis-
missal and a large settlement.'4 Therefore, pleading requirements
for scienter are a critical component in striking a balance that
eliminates non-meritorious claims while affording access to the
judicial process for those truly injured by securities fraud.'5
In response to the debate over the impact of securities fraud
litigation, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Re-
Eth & Michael Dicke, Insider Stock Sales in Rule lOb-5 Corporate Disclosure
Cases: Separating the Innocent from the Suspicious, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
97, 111 (1994). Other estimates have placed the number at seven percent.
See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 9 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. 679, 688.
10. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975)
("[Elven a complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance
of success at trial has a settlement value to plaintiff... so long as he may
prevent the suit from being resolved against him by dismissal or summary
judgment.") (emphasis added); see also Barbara Moses & Rachael K. Jeck, Se-
curities Litigation Reform, 28 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 31, 32 (1995)
(identifying one-way discovery, potentially enormous verdicts, and the dis-
ruption of normal business activities as factors dictating settlement after a
claim survives initial pleading motions).
1L See Michael A. Collora, New Terrain, Strategies for Mass. Plaintiffs,
MASS. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 8, 1996, at 11.
12. See BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 432 (3d ed. 1991). In the securities
fraud context, certain forms of recklessness also constitute scienter. See dis-
cussion infra Part LB.1.
13. See, e.g., D. Brian Hufford, Deterring Fraud vs. Avoiding the "Strike
Suit".: Reaching an Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 593, 624-25
(1995) (discussing the difficulties of defining a motive at the pleading stage).
14 See Sherrid, supra note 6, at 67 (quoting William S. Lerach, securities
fraud lawyer, as saying 'Trials turn on such distinctions."); see also In re Time
Warner Inc. See. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the ramifi-
cations of pre-trial motions in securities fraud actions).
15. See William IL Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 175-76 (1997)




form Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which implemented various proce-
dural protections in an effort to curb frivolous litigation. One
such procedural protection was section 21D(b)(2),"7 which was
enacted to strengthen pleading requirements for scienter by in-
troducing a heightened and nationally uniform pleading stan-
dard." Although Congress intended section 21D(b)(2) to resolve
a circuit split over the pleading requirements for scienter, im-
precise drafting and conflicting legislative history have resulted
in continuing disagreement among federal courts over the proper
interpretation of the provision. 9
Federal courts interpreting section 21D(b)(2) must confront
two interrelated issues. First, a court must consider what impact,
if any, the provision has on the substantive law of securities
fraud. This inquiry typically focuses on whether recklessness, in
addition to intent, constitutes scienter under 21D(b)(2). This is-
sue is not a pleading issue; rather, it involves the substantive
definition of scienter." However, "to the extent... that reck-
lessness constitutes scienter, it has to be in the pleading stan-
dard in some fashion since if it cannot be pled, then it is no
longer a basis for establishing scienter."2' Therefore, defining
16. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, amends the Securities Act of 1933(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)), and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
7811 (1994 & Supp. 11995)).
17. The section provides:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff
may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted
with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to
each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with par-
ticularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1 1995) (emphasis added).
18. See Edward Brodsky, Scienter Under the Reform Act of 1995, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 8, 1997, at 3 (discussing Congress's intent to strengthen pleading
standards); Paul H. Dawes, Pleading Motions Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 37, 60 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 958, 1996) (noting that
uniformity is a primary purpose of 21D(b)(2)).
19. See Seth Goodchild & Stephenie L. Brown, Institutional Investors and
PSLRA Pleading Standard, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5, 1997, at 1 ("The most contro-
versial and hotly litigated issue in securities fraud class actions in the post-
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) era is the Act's heightened
requirements for pleading scienter."); see also discussion infra Part H
(considering competing judicial interpretations of 21D(b)(2)).
20. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 96 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
21. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL ET AL., SEcuRrrIEs LAW HANDBOOK §
17.03[1][b], at 946 (1997 ed.).
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the boundary of scienter is a necessary prerequisite to evaluat-
ing pleadings under 21D(b)(2). Second, a court must determine
what facts a plaintiff must plead to satisfy the 21D(b)(2) stan-
dard. While 21D(b)(2) clearly requires a factual basis for plead-
ing scienter, the provision does not specify what facts are neces-
sary to survive a motion to dismiss.' Specifically, 21D(b)(2) calls
into question the viability of a Second Circuit pre-PSLRA pleading
test which allows plaintiffs to plead scienter by alleging a motive
and opportunity to commit fraud.'
This Note argues that section 21D(b)(2) requires plaintiffs to
plead direct or circumstantial evidence giving rise to a strong in-
ference of reckless or knowing misrepresentation in order to plead
scienter under section 21D(b)(2). Part I recounts the development
of private securities fraud litigation and the legislative history of
section 21D(bX2). Part H outlines the split in the federal courts
over the proper interpretation of 21D(b)(2). Part III critically ex-
amines the text and legislative history of section 21D(b)(2) and
concludes that the provision did not alter pre-PSLRA liability for
recklessness but did eliminate the motive and opportunity test as
an independent pleading method. Part IV argues that this inter-
pretation is preferable as a matter of policy as well.
I. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION: THE JUDICIAL
EXPANSION AND LEGISLATIVE CONTRACTION OF AN
IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION
A. TEE PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER RULE 10B-5
The modern era of regulated securities markets began with
the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which were efforts to insure uniform ac-
cess to information and to increase investors's ability to rely on
corporate releases.' In 1942, under authority of the Securities
22. The provision requires a plaintiff to "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference" that the defendant acted with scienter, but
does not specify what facts give rise to such a strong inference. 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1 1995).
23. See, e.g., In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. at 242 (concluding that motive and
opportunity pleading does not automatically suffice to raise a strong inference
of scienter).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78M1 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
26. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647,664 (1986).
1998] 1107
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Exchange Act section 10(b),27 the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) instituted Rule 10b-5, which prohibited securities
fraud.28 Although neither section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act nor Rule 10b-5 explicitly provided a private cause of
action,29 federal courts soon recognized the rights of private liti-
gants to seek relief under Rule 10b-5.2 To state a claim for relief
under Rule 10b-5, courts require plaintiffs to allege reliance on
material misstatements or omissions which were made with sci-
enter in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.' The
10b-5 claim has become the most popular cause of action for se-
27. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994). Courts and commentators have identified numerous
policies underlying section 10(b), all of which are closely related. See 5A
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1OB-5 § 6.01, at
191 (1997). Such policies include preservation of free and honest markets,
equal access to information, equalization of bargaining position, disclosure,
protection of investors, fairness, fostering investor trust, and both deterrence
and compensation. See id.
28. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729
(1975). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . ..
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
29. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729.
30. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D.
Pa. 1946) (finding a private cause of action under 10b-5). The Supreme Court
did not directly address the private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 until Su-
perintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971), by which time the viability of the 10b-5 private cause of action was
well established. See JACOBS, supra note 27, § 8.02, at 236.
31. See, e.g., Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986). It should
be noted that, because these elements are judge-made law, they may vary
considerably between jurisdictions. See generally JACOBS, supra note 27, §§ 5,
6.01, at 177-94. (outlining how administrative and legislative history and the
policy underlying Rule 10b-5 influence its application).
[Vol. 82:11031108
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curities fraud plaintiffs,'2 primarily because most courts allow
class certification for such claims while also allowing rather
conclusory pleadings?3
B. PLEADING SCIENTER UNDER RULE 1OB-5 AND RULE 9(B)
Before the PSLRA, the scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5
presented federal courts with two issues: first, whether reckless-
ness constituted scienter as a substantive basis of liability; and
second, whether, as a matter of procedure, plaintiffs were re-
quired to plead specific facts showing scienter.
1. Pre-PSLRA Courts Uniformly Held That Intent and
Recklessness Constitute Scienter Under Rule 10b-5
As a matter of substantive law, Rule 10b-5 provides no
guidance as to what state of mind a defendant must possess to
be found liable; thus, courts were required to determine whether
negligence, recklessness, or intent were sufficient. The Supreme
Court addressed the issue of substantive liability in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, holding that a negligent state of mind does
not constitute scienter as required by Rule 10b-5' Although the
Court reasoned that scienter embraced an intent to deceive, it did
not address the sufficiency of recklessness in satisfying the Rule?'
While the Supreme Court failed to determine whether
recklessness constituted scienter, every circuit court of appeals
to consider the issue has found recklessness to be an actionable
state of mind under Rule 10b-5.36 Although recklessness is sub-
32. See Collora, supra note 11, at 11; Moses & Jeck, supra note 10, at 32.
The popularity and growth of the Rule lOb-5 private action led Justice
Rehnquist to describe it as "a judicial oak which has grown from little more
than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737.
33. See Moses & Jeck, supra note 10, at 32 (discussing reasons for the
claim's popularity).
34. 425 U.S. 185,193-94 (1976).
35. See id. at 194 n.12. The court stated "[i]n certain areas of the law
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of
imposing liability for some act. We need not address here the question
whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liabil-
ity under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id.
36. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig.,
881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989); Van Dyke v. Coburn Enter. Inc. 873 F.2d
1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d
809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th
Cir. 1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981)
(en banc) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Tur-
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ject to varying interpretations, 7 most courts have reasoned that
the recklessness required by Rule 10b-5 is that the defendant
acted without regard to the truth of the statement-essentially,
bad faith."8 Thus, federal courts typically find that a plaintiff es-
tablishes recklessness when she shows that the defendant was
aware of a substantial possibility that his statement was inaccu-
rate or was aware that the statement was made without a solid
basis for determining its truthfulness. 9
2. Pre-PSLRA Courts Split on the Issue of Pleading Specificity
While courts uniformly held that recklessness constituted
scienter under Rule 10b-5, they were divided on the issue of
what facts alleging scienter, if any, plaintiffs had to plead to
survive a motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion.
Faced with a lack of guidance from the statute, regulation, or the
Supreme Court, federal circuit courts turned to Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "[iln all
averments of fraud.., the circumstances constituting
fraud... shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be
averred generally."' Examining this language, the Second and
Ninth Circuit developed two distinct standards for pleading sci-
ben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (6th Cir. 1979); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685,
692 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Byth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d
Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
37. See, e.g., In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(noting that recklessness denotes a type of negligence in some contexts). See
generally Kuehnle, supra note 15, at 178-87 (discussing various subjective and
objective definitions of recklessness under the common law of fraud and fed-
eral securities laws).
38. The standard enunciated by the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand Corp.
v. Sun Chem. Corp. is the definition typically employed in the securities fraud
context. See 553 F.2d at 1045. The court defined reckless conduct as:
a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards
of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or
sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the
actor must have been aware of it.
Id. (citing Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725
(W.D. Okla. 1976)).
39. See Kuehnle, supra note 15, at 168 (explaining the federal reckless-
ness standard). Both standards imply a moral deficiency rather than mere
carelessness. See id. at 170.
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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enter: one requiring only a general allegation of scienter and one
requiring a degree of particularity."
In In re Glenfed, Inc. Securities Litigation, the Ninth Circuit
held that scienter, as a "condition of mind" under Rule 9(b), could
be pleaded in a general or conclusory manner.42 The court rea-
soned that this was the only interpretation textually compatible
with Rule 9(b),43 and that the judiciary was not empowered to
change pleading standards on the basis of policy.' Therefore, in
the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff could satisfy the scienter require-
ment by pleading that the necessary scienter existed, without
setting forth any facts supporting that allegation.45
Although the Second Circuit agreed that state of mind could
be averred generally, it also held that general pleading did not
mean conclusory pleading." Thus, Second Circuit courts required
plaintiffs to allege specific facts which created a "strong infer-
ence" that the defendants possessed the requisite scienter.47 A
plaintiff could satisfy this strong inference pleading standard by
presenting direct evidence of scienter or by meeting one of two
pleading tests. First, a plaintiff could establish a strong inference
of scienter by pleading facts which constituted "circumstantial
evidence" of either reckless or intentional behavior.49 Alterna-
41. See generally Laurence A. Steckman & Kenneth M. Moltner, Pleading
Scienter in Securities Fraud Cases Under Rule 9(b)-Is the Pleading of Facts
Sufficient to Give Rise to a "Strong Inference" of Fraudulent Intent Really In-
compatible with the Federal Rules?, 1995 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 99 (1995)(discussing the split of authority between the Second Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit regarding pleading standards for scienter).
42. See 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994) (enbanc).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1545-46. The court noted the "weeding out" effect of the
Second Circuit test, but felt that adding new pleading requirements was "a job
for Congress." Id. at 1546.
45. See id. at 1545.
46. See Connecticut Natl Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir.
1987) (explaining that plaintiffs must plead some factual basis for allegations
of intent); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979)
(explaining that plaintiffs must plead some factual basis for allegations of in-
tent), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); see also Steckman & Moltner, supra
note 41, at 99 (outlining the Second Circuit standard).
47. See Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 808 F.2d at 962; Ross, 607 F.2d at 558.
48. See Shields v. Citytrust Bankeorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir.
1994) (discussing alternative methods by which a plaintiff may properly plead
scienter); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993)
(discussing alternative methods by which a plaintiff may properly plead scien-
ter), cert. denied 511 U.S. 1017 (1994).
49. See In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269.
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tively, a plaintiff could plead "motive and opportunity" to create a
strong inference of scienter, by showing that the defendants had a
financial motive to commit fraud and a clear opportunity to do so.'
C. ENACTMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECURrIIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT OF 1995 AND 21D(B)(2)
The split between the Second and Ninth Circuits became
one of several major issues addressed in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995."' One of the most controversial
sections of the Act was section 21D(b)(2), which ostensibly re-
solved this circuit split by requiring plaintiffs to "state with par-
ticularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind.' = Although legislators
agreed on the inclusion of the strong inference standard, the
provision as enacted did not resolve the definition of scienter or
the acceptable methods of pleading it.
1. House Deliberations
The first bill proposed in the House of Representatives, Title
II of H.R. 10, signaled a radical departure from Rule 10b-5 law
as defined by federal circuit courts. One provision of the bill
specifically addressed the issue of scienter, requiring plaintiffs to
plead direct evidence of scienter and abolishing liability for
recklessness.53 This section mandated a level of scienter plead-
50. See id. at 269-71.
5L Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). In a piecemeal fashion, the
Act addressed a number of securities fraud issues, including limitations on
liability and damages, checks on professional plaintiffs, and heightened
pleading burdens. See generally Stephen F. Black et al., The Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Preliminary Analysis, in 15TH ANNUAL
FEDERAL SECURMIES INSTITUTE 621 (1997) (providing a broad overview of the
various provisions of the PSLRA).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1997).
53. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 204 (1995). The provision stated:
SEC. 10A. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS
(a) SCIENTER.-In any action under section 10(b), a defendant
may be held liable for money damages only on proof-
(1) that the defendant made an untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact, or omitted to state a material fact necessary in or-
der to make the statements made, in light of the circum-
stances in which they were made, not misleading; and
(2) that the defendant knew the statement was misleading at
the time it was made, or intentionally omitted to state a fact
knowing that such omission would render misleading the
statements made at the time they were made.
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR EXPLICIT PLEADING AND PROOF OF
[Vol. 82:11031112
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ing exceeding even the stringent Second Circuit standard.' The
proposal was met with considerable opposition by the Securities
Exchange Commission, which objected to the elimination of
recklessness as a condition for liability.5 The Commission's
stance was apparently influential, because the final House version
of the bill, titled H.R. 1058, resolved the question of substantive
liability by reinstating liability for recklessness.5" Although the
bill passed the House,.7 it was eventually rejected by the Confer-
ence Committee in favor of the Senate version.
2. Senate Deliberations and the Enactment of Section 21D(b)(2)
Senate proposal S. 240 marked the first appearance of the
Second Circuit's strong inference language in the proposed legis-
lation. Although the strong inference standard was added to the
bill, language pertaining to the Second Circuits motive and oppor-
tunity and circumstantial evidence pleading tests was not in-
SCIENTER.-In any action under section 10(b) in which it is al-
leged that the defendant-
(1) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(2) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
in which they were made, not misleading;
the complaint shall allege specific facts demonstrating the state
of mind of each defendant at the time the alleged violation oc-
curred ....
Id& (emphasis added).
54. See The Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before
the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Commerce,
104th Cong. 199 (1995) [hereinafter H.R. 10 Hearings] (statement of Arthur
Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
55. See ER. REP. No. 104-50 at 63 (1995). Chairman Levitt stated the
SEC's stance:
We really want corporations-we want executives of corporations-to
worry about the accuracy of their disclosures. It is the best way I
know to assure the markets of a continuous stream of reliable, accu-
rate information. Any higher scienter standard threatens the process
that has made our markets what they are. Indeed, an actual knowl-
edge standard could create a legal incentive to ignore indication of
fraud. The phrase, "Ignorance is bliss," could take on, unhappily,
new meaning.
H.R. 10 Hearings, supra note 54, at 194-95 (statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, SEC).
56. See 141 CoNG. REc. H2306 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995); H.R. 1058, 104th
Cong. (1995). H.R. 1058 adopted the Sundstrand definition of recklessness.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-39 (discussing the securities fraud
definition of recklessness).
57. The bill passed on a vote of 325 to 99. See 141 CONG. REC. H2863-64
(daily ed. March 8, 1995).
58. See infra Part I.C.2. (discussing the evolution of the Senate bill).
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cluded. 9 S. 240 was met with approval from both the SEC and
the White House.'
In June of 1995, Senator Arlen Specter proposed an
amendment that further clarified the scienter pleading issue by
adopting the Second Circuit's case law in full." Under the Specter
Amendment, a plaintiff could meet 21D(b)(2)'s "strong inference"
standard by pleading facts which would meet either the
"circumstantial evidence" test or the "motive and opportunity"
test employed in the Second Circuit.' Although the amendment
passed, 3 the language was later dropped during conference report
mark-ups.'
The final Conference Report and accompanying Statement
of the Managers were released on November 28, 1995."5 House
proposal H.R. 1058 had been dropped in favor in S. 240, and the
Conference Committee included the "strong inference" standard
in the text of the scienter pleading provision.' The Conference
Committee expressed two reservations, however, in its State-
ment of the Managers. First, the Committee stated that
"H[b]ecause the Conference Committee intends to strengthen ex-
isting pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the
59. See S. RaP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995). The Senate Banking Committee,
which was responsible for the addition, stated that it did "not intend to codify
the Second Circuit's caselaw interpreting this pleading standard, although
courts may find this body of law instructive." Id.
60. See William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under
Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity,
Recklessness, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 893, 944 (1996).
61. The proposed addition read as follows:
[A] strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind may be established either-
(A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive
and opportunity to commit fraud; or
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evi-
dence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant.
141 CONG. REc. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995). The proposal's text was
based on the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's language in Beck v. Manufac-
turers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987).
62. See, e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-269 (2d
Cir. 1993).
63. The amendment passed by a vote of 57 to 42. See 141 CONG. REC.
S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995). It was also included in S. 240 as passed by
the Senate. See 141 CONG. REC. S9219, S9222 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 n.23 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,740 n.23.
65. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CAN. 679.
66. See id. at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CA.N. 679, 740.
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Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard."67
Second, in an apparent reference to the omission of Senator
Specter's amendment, the Committee stated that "the Confer-
ence Report chose not to include in the pleading standard certain
language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness."" The
Committee did not explain this omission, however, leaving
courts to consider whether the statement constitutes a disavow-
ment of these legal doctrines, or merely an unwillingness to cod-
ify the aforementioned language.
President Clinton vetoed the legislation on December 19,
1995. The President objected not to the statute's text, but to
the Statement of the Managers accompanying the Conference
Committee Report, which he felt would raise the pleading stan-
dards beyond that required in the Second Circuit.7" Congress
overrode the President's veto and the bill passed into law on De-
cember 22, 1995.:'
11. FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION
21D(B)(2)
As it turned out, Senator Specters concerns regarding judicial
implementation of 21D(bX2) were well-founded. While it is clear
that the Ninth Circuit's general pleading standard is no longer
sufficient under section 21D(bX2),' the provisions impact on both
67. Id.
68. Id. at 41 n.23.
69. President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning With-
out Approval the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 2210 (Dec. 19, 1995).
70. More specifically, the President explained:
I believe that the pleading requirements of the Conference Report
with regard to a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable
procedural hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in Federal
courts. I am prepared to support the high pleading standard of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-the highest pleading
standard of any Federal circuit court. But the conferees make crystal
clear in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard
even beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept that.
Id.
71. The House vote was 319 to 100; the Senate voted 68-30. See John W.
Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAw. 335, 353 (1996).
72. See Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (S.D. Cal. 1997);
Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm- Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1310-
11 (C.D. Cal. 1996). For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's general pleading
requirements, see supra text accompanying notes 42-45. Because 21D(b)(2)
requires plaintiffs to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong in-
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the substantive liability threshold and the procedural methods of
meeting it are uncertain. Faced with inconsistent legislative his-
tory and ambiguous statutory text, federal courts are divided over
the proper interpretation of the provision. Federal courts inter-
preting 21D(b)(2) generally fall into one of three categories 4
A. SECTION 21D(B)(2) REQUIRES HIGHER PLEADING AND
LiABmrrY STANDARDS THAN THOSE OF THE SECOND CIRCU1T
Several courts have held that section 21D(b)(2) eliminates
both the motive and opportunity test as an independent method
of adequately pleading scienter and the sufficiency of recklessness
as a basis of substantive liability.75 The reasoning of the North-
ern District Court of California in In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Se-
curities Litigation exemplifies this interpretation. 6 Discussing the
motive and opportunity test, the Silicon Graphics court noted
the Conference Committee's intent to strengthen pleading
standards and the Committee's express refusal to codify Second
Circuit pleading tests.2 The court also noted the Conference
Committee's rejection of the Specter amendment and President
ference," 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1994), it supersedes the Ninth Circuit gen-
eral pleading standard.
73. Compare Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1310-13 (holding that
21D(b)(2) retains both the motive and opportunity test and recklessness liability),
In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 201 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (same), Shahzad v. H.J. Meyers & Co., No. 95 Civ. 6196 (DAB), 1997 WL
47817, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1997) (holding that 21D(b)(2) is a de facto
codification of Second Circuit pleading standards), and Rehm v. Eagle Fin.
Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1250-57 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (same), with Voit v. Won-
derware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 373-74 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that
21D(b)(2) eliminates the motive and opportunity test and recklessness liabil-
ity and adopts a conscious behavior test), Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse
Inc., 959 F. Supp. 205, 208-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same), In re Silicon Graphics,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL 664639, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25,
1996) (reaffirmed on motion to reconsider at 970 F. Supp. 746, 757 (N.D. Cal.
May 23, 1997)) (same), and Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42,
46-50 (D. Mass. 1997) (same). The In re Baesa decision represents a third
distinct approach. See 969 F. Supp. 238, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that
21D(b)(2) abolishes the motive and opportunity test but does not change liabil-
ity for recklessness); accord Press v. Quick & Reilly, No. 96 Civ. 4278 (RPP),
1997 WL 458666, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997).
74 See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Scienter Requirement Under
the Securities Litigation Reform, N.Y. L.J., July 17, 1997, at 5.
75. See In re Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *6; Norwood Venture
Corp., 959 F. Supp. at 208; Friedberg, 959 F. Supp. at 49-50.
76. See 1996 WL 664639, at *6.
77. See id. at *5. The court found that "the legislative history, the most
definitive part of which [was] the Conference Committee Report, establishe[d]
the SRA standard as stricter than the Second Circuit standard." Id. at *6 n4.
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Clinton's belief that 21D(b)(2) adopted a new, more stringent
standard.7 ' Based on this legislative evidence, the court con-
cluded that "Congress did not intend to codify the Second Circuit
standard," but instead intended to codify a heightened pleading
standard which disposed of the motive and opportunity test:9
The court held that under section 21D(b)(2), a "plaintiff must
allege specific facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of
conscious behavior by defendants" and cannot survive a motion
to dismiss by pleading motive and opportunity to commit fraud."
In addition to holding that 21D(b)(2) abolished the motive
and opportunity test, the Silicon Graphics court held that reck-
lessness was no longer a sufficient basis of liability for a 10b-5
claim.8' Since the court did not distinguish between the sub-
stantive concept of scienter and the procedural pleading tests, its
analysis of recklessness under 21D(b)(2) paralleled its discussion
of the motive and opportunity test.' The court reasoned that
Congress's intent to strengthen pleading standards, as well as
the PSLRA's goal of reducing frivolous litigation, required it to
eliminate liability for recklessness as well as eliminate the mo-
tive and opportunity test.'
B. SECTION 21D(B)(2) AS A DE FACTO CODIFICATION OF SECOND
Cmcurr CASE LAW
In Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical
Corp., the Central District Court of California offered a second
78. See id. at *5.
79. Id. at *6.
80. Id
81. See i. at *6-7. The court reconsidered its decision to eliminate reck-
lessness as a basis for liability when it examined the plaintiffs amended
complaint in In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D.
Cal. 1997). The court adhered to its original interpretation of the provision's
legislative history, although it defended its elimination of recklessness by ar-
guing that it was consistent with Second Circuit law. See id. at 755-757. The
court appeared to waver slightly on its abolition of recklessness by reasoning
that its interpretation of intent encompassed some forms of recklessness, al-
though the contours of this definition were left undefined. See id. at 757.
82. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. See. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL
664639, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996). The court found the Conference
Committee Report virtually dispositive with regard to the issue of reckless-
ness. See id. at *5.
83. See id. at *6. The court admonished the plaintiff for "resist[ing] the
political reality underlying the SRA and felt that its "interpretation [wals




interpretation of section 21D(b)(2).M The Marksman Partners
interpretation, which has been adopted by a number of courts,
retains both liability for recklessness and the Second Circuit's
motive and opportunity pleading test." Analyzing the provi-
sion's impact on substantive liability, the Marksman Partners
court noted that the "safe harbor" and "joint and several liability"
provisions of the PSLRA explicitly eliminate liability for reckless
misstatements in certain circumstances, while section 21D(b)(2)
does not." The court concluded that this fact strongly implied
that Congress did not intend to eliminate liability for reckless-
ness in 10b-5 claims. 7 According to the court, the Conference
Committee report, with its reference to Second Circuit law, rein-
forced this conclusion.88
The court next discussed the sufficiency of motive and op-
portunity pleading under section 21D(b)(2). 9 The court noted
that the Second Circuit's pleading standard was the most strin-
gent in existence, and that Congress decided to include Second
Circuit language in the provision." These two facts implied that
Congress intended to codify Second Circuit law, including the
motive and opportunity test." Furthermore, the court argued
that the motive and opportunity test still required plaintiffs to
create a strong inference of fraudulent intent thereby complying
with Congress's intent to strengthen pleading standards.'
84. 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
85. See id. at 1308-1312; accord In re Health Management, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Shahzad v. H.J. Meyers & Co.,
No. 95 Civ. 6196 (DAB), 1997 WL 47817, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1997); Rehm
v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1250-57 (N.D. 11. 1997).
86. See 927 F. Supp. at 1308, 1309 n.9.
87. See id. at 1309.
88. See id. at 1309 n.9. According to the court, the Conference Committee
report "suggests that Congress did not intend to change the state of mind re-
quirements of existing law... [which] is confirmed by the absence of any ex-
press abrogation in the PSLRA of recklessness liability." Id.
89. See id. at 1310-12.
90. See id. at 1310. "[Ihe conference committee emphasized that the
Second Circuit's pleading standards were the most stringent of any circuit's,
and thus it is reasonable to assume that Second Circuit jurisprudence comes
closest to approximating the PSLRA's new requirements." Id. The court also
noted that the strong inference language used by the PSLRA "mirrors lan-
guage traditionally employed by the Second Circuit in its application of Rule
9(b) to scienter pleadings." Id.
91. See id. at 1310-12.
92. See id. at 1311. By requiring plaintiffs to allege circumstances giving
rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent, "the 'motive and opportunity'
test appears to be consistent with Congress's intent that scienter be pled with
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The Marksman Partners court also addressed the Confer-
ence Committee's decision not to codify Second Circuit law and
to omit motive and opportunity language. 3 The court reasoned
that the report's language did not constitute a disavowment of
the motive and opportunity test because Congress would have
explicitly abandoned the motive and opportunity test in the body
of the statute if it intended to do so.' Furthermore, the court
reasoned, the report of the Senate Banking Committee authorizes
courts to apply Second Circuit law." Therefore, under Marks-
man Partners, a plaintiff may plead circumstantial evidence of
recklessness or knowledge of falsity, or in the alternative, plead
motive and opportunity which creates a strong inference of
recklessness or knowledge of falsity.
C. SECTION 21D(B)(2) SUPERSEDES SECOND CIRCUrr PLEADING
TESTS BUT DOES NOT ALTER EXISTING SUBSTANTIVE LAW
In In re Baesa Securities Litigation,96 the Southern District
of New York offered a third interpretation which has been fol-
lowed by one other court.' The Baesa court held that 21D(b)(2)
did not alter the substantive definition of scienter, but that
pleading only "motive and opportunity" does not automatically
create a strong inference of scienter sufficient to survive a mo-
tion to dismiss?' Discussing the question of whether 21D(b)(2)
abrogates liability for recklessness, the Baesa court noted that
the mental state required for liability was conceptually distinct
from the factual allegations a plaintiff must plead to show a basis
for requisite state of mind.' The court reasoned that because
more than conclusory or generic allegations." Id. at 1310-11.
93. See id. at 1310-12.
94. See id. at 1311. The court reasoned:
[An oblique reference to 'motive, opportunity and recklessness' in a
footnote to the Conference Committee report... implies that Con-
gress chose not to codify motive and opportunity as pleading re-
quirements but does not indicate that Congress chose to specifically
disapprove the motive and opportunity test. The Court has little
doubt that when Congress wishes to supplant a judicially-created
rule it knows how to do so explicitly, and in the body of the statute.
Id.
95. See id.
96. 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
97. See Press v. Quick & Reilly, No. 96 Civ. 4278 (RPP), 1997 WL 458666
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997).
98. See 969 F. Supp. at 238.
99. See id. at 240-42.
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21D(b)(2) addresses only pleading" it does not change the suffi-
ciency of recklessness for establishing liability.'' The court sup-
ported this conclusion by noting the great weight of case law es-
tablishing liability for recklessness and the absence of statutory
language indicating a contrary Congressional intent."
The court then discussed the sufficiency of pleading "motive
and opportunity" under 21D(b)(2). 3 Once again relying on the
statute's text, the court noted that 21D(b)(2) codified the "strong
inference" standard while failing to mention any particular test,
including "motive and opportunity," which would satisfy the
"strong inference" standard." The court reasoned that this indi-
cated an intent to eliminate motive and opportunity as an inde-
pendently sufficient pleading test. 5 Thus, the court concluded,
a plaintiff pleading only motive and opportunity generally does
not create a strong inference of scienter and therefore will not
survive a motion to dismiss.'"
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND TEXT OF SECTION
21D(B)(2) REQUIRES COURTS TO ADOPT THE BAESA
STANDARD
An examination of the text and legislative history of
21D(b)(2) establishes that the standard for pleading scienter
enunciated in In re Baesa, which requires plaintiffs to plead ei-
ther direct or circumstantial evidence giving rise to a strong in-
ference of reckless or knowing misconduct," is most consistent
with Congress's intent and the statutory language. This inter-
pretation recognizes that section 21D(b)(2) is essentially a pro-
vision governing pleading that does not alter the substantive law
of 10b-5 claims. This interpretation also reflects Congress's de-
100. See id. at 240.
101 See id. at 24142.
102. See id. at 241. The court noted in passing a few cases that made ref-
erences to recklessness in the legislative history, but rejected their "selective
reading of the convoluted legislative history for the clear and unambiguous
language of the statute." Id. at 241 & nl.
103. See id. at 242.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. The court did note, however, that well-pleaded nonconclusory
factual allegations regarding motive and opportunity are still relevant as cir-
cumstantial evidence of scienter and could, in some cases, provide the neces-
sary "strong inference" of scienter. See id.
107. See id. at 238.
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cision not to codify the motive and opportunity test by eliminat-
ing the test's use as an alternative method of pleading scienter.
A. SECTION 21D(B)(2) DOES NOT ABROGATE LIABILTY FOR
RECKLESS MISSTATEMENTS
1. Courts Fail to Distinguish Between Procedural Pleading
Requirements and Substantive Standards for Liability
The Silicon Graphics court concluded that the legislative
history and purpose of 21D(b)(2) dictated abolishing liability for
reckless misstatements."8 In doing so, the court failed to ac-
knowledge the difference between procedural pleading tests and
substantive standards for liability.'" This misunderstanding is
exemplified by the courts discussion of the substance of Senator
Specter's rejected amendment and the legislative history of
21D(b)(2)."0
The Silicon Graphics court erred by stating that under
Senator Specter's amendment "a plaintiff [could] use allegations
of recklessness or motive and opportunity to establish fraudulent
intent,""' implying that recklessness was the equivalent of mo-
tive and opportunity. Under the Silicon Graphics conceptuali-
zation, pleading recklessness was an alternative procedural
method of pleading scienter. Because it conflated the issues of
pleading and liability, the court failed to conduct an independent
analysis of recklessness under section 21D(b)(2).
The Silicon Graphics approach is flawed because recklessness
is a substantive element of scienter, whereas motive and oppor-
tunity pleading is a method by which a plaintiff can create a
strong inference of scienter."' For example, before the enactment
108. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WTL
664639, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
109. The Silicon Graphics court was not the only court to confuse the rela-
tionship between pleading standards and liability standards. For example, a
federal district court in Massachusetts also considered recklessness as an ad-
ditional pleading test. See Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, 959 F. Supp. 42, 49 (D.
Mass. 1997). Another case, Partners, L.P. v. Sensormatic Electronics Corp.,
No. 96-C4072, 1997 WL 570771, at *18 (N.D. IMl. Sept. 10, 1997), held that the
plaintiff had alleged "sufficient facts to raise a 'strong inference' of the defen-
dants motive and opportunity' to commit the fraud" and had therefore satis-
fied section 21D(b)(2).
110. See Silicon Graphics, 1996 WL 664639, at *5.
111. Id.
112. See In re Time Warner Inc. See. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir.
1993). The Time Warner court sets out the motive and opportunity test and
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of the PSLRA, a plaintiff in the Second Circuit could allege a
motive and opportunity which would create a strong inference of
reckless or knowing misconduct."' By ostensibly eliminating
recklessness as a method of pleading scienter, the Silicon Graph-
ics court effectively removed recklessness as basis for liability."'
This is clearly improper because section 21D(b)(2) is a provision
addressing only pleading standards and it does not purport to
alter substantive liability standards.'15
2. Courts That Eliminate Liability for Recklessness
Misconstrue Section 21D(b)(2)'s Text and Legislative History
a. Silicon Graphics Court Misinterpreted Legislative History
Despite the fact that section 21D(b)(2) was a provision pri-
marily intended to address procedural pleading standards, the
Silicon Graphics court claimed that 21D(b)(2)'s legislative his-
tory compelled its decision to eliminate liability for reckless-
ness. 6 In particular, the court found three pieces of history per-
suasive: 1) the rejected Specter Amendment, 2) the Statement of
the Managers, and 3) the Presidential veto. 7
The court first reasoned that the rejection of the Specter
Amendment compelled a rejection of all the language contained
the circumstantial evidence test as two distinct methods of creating a strong
inference of fraudulent intent. See id. "Fraudulent intent" encompasses both
recklessness and knowledge.
113. See id.
114 See Concerning the Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Arthur
Levitt, Chairman, SEC), available in 1997 WL 11235194. Chairman Levitt
expressed concern about decisions abolishing recklessness:
While these decisions address the pleading requirements of the
Reform Act, they may also affect the substantive liability require-
ments of the securities laws themselves. The law is well established in
each of the ten federal appellate courts that have considered the is-
sue, that proof of recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement and
can establish liability under the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
115. See In re Baesa, 969 F.3d at 240. As a preliminary matter, the court
noted that "one must first distinguish between the mental state required for
securities fraud liability ('scienter) and the level of pleadings required to ade-
quately allege that mental state at the outset of a lawsuit. The [PSLRA]
speaks only to the latter." Id.
116. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL




therein."' This blanket rejection approach is ill conceived, how-
ever, because it fails to account for the specific reasons why the
amendment was not enacted. None of the opposition leveled at
the Specter Amendment was directed at its reference to reck-
lessness; rather, opponents criticized the Amendment's attempt
to codify the Second Circuit's pleading tests."9 Moreover, if the
Amendment was dropped out of desire to abolish liability for
recklessness, the issue surely would have provoked opposition by
the SEC, since a prior express attempt to abolish liability for
recklessness faced overwhelming opposition. 2 ' Instead, the SEC
response indicated that the draft was acceptable. "2 ' The elimi-
nation of recklessness language was, therefore, a by-product of
congressional resistance to presumptive pleading methods, not
an attack on recklessness as a basis of liability.
The Silicon Graphics court next reasoned that the Confer-
ence Committee's decision "not to include in the pleading standard
certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or reckless-
ness"'7 compelled elimination of both the motive and opportu-
nity pleading test and recklessness liability." Admittedly, the
Conference Committee stated that it omitted "language pertain-
ing to motive, opportunity and recklessness" because it intended
to strengthen pleading standards,24 but the Silicon Graphics
court examined this statement out of context. Its interpretation
of the Statement of the Managers fails on two grounds.
First, the Committee's statement addresses the removal of
the Specter language from the provision, not the removal of
recklessness from 21D(bX2).' The opposition to the Specter
Amendment was based on the Amendments codification of Second
Circuit case law, not on the inclusion of the universally recog-
118. See id. at *5.
119. See 141 CONG. REC. S9172 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Bennett) (arguing that the courts should be given latitude as to how to meet
the strong inference test); 141 CoNG. REc. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995)
(statement of Sen. D'Amato) (arguing that explicit language would
"straitjacket" the courts).
120. See supra note 55 for a description of the SEC's staunch opposition to
a previous attempt in the House to abolish liability for recklessness.
12L See Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 60, at 948 & n.317.
122. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 n.23 (1995).
123. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL
664639, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
124. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41.
125. See Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 60, at 949.
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nized assertion that a reckless state of mind constitutes scienter.'
Thus, the Statement of the Managers simply restates what is al-
ready clear from the Specter Amendment debate: the motive and
opportunity test was rejected by Congress,'27 but recklessness is
still the appropriate standard of liability under 21D(b)(2).
Second, interpreting the Statement of Managers to elimi-
nate liability for recklessness overlooks the fact that an explicit
attempt to abolish liability for recklessness was soundly defeated
in the House of Representatives.'28 An early House version of the
bill which provided that a plaintiff must prove either knowledge
or intent drew swift and vigorous response from the SEC, which
claimed that eliminating the recklessness standard would dis-
courage claimants and therefore reduce the deterrent effect of
private securities litigation.'29 After the SEC protested the pro-
posed change in liability standards, language creating liability
for recklessness was restored to the bill and the issue was never
again debated.30  Given the heated debate over the House's at-
tempt to jettison liability for recklessness, it seems unlikely that
the Conference Committee would have quietly accomplished this
feat in a footnote.
Finally, the Silicon Graphics court claimed that President
Clinton's veto message indicated that 21D(b)(2) mandates a
pleading standard higher than that of the Second Circuit and
that Congress's override validated Clinton's interpretation. 3'
This observation fails on two grounds. First, by accepting the
President's construction of 21D(b)(2) the court allows the defeated
opponents of 21D(b)(2) to control the meaning of the provision.'
Second, Congress may have overridden the veto because it felt
that President Clinton's objections were based on an erroneous
construction of 21D(b)(2).'33 Therefore, Congress's veto override
126. See infra text accompanying notes 146-149.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 146-149.
128. See supra Part I.C.1 (explaining that the final version of the House
bill reinstated liability for recklessness).
129. See supra note 55 for a discussion of the SEC's opposition to the pro-
vision, and see supra note 53 for the text of the proposal.
130. See Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 60, at 935-36.
13L See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 96-0393, 1996 WL
664639, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996).
132. See John C. Coffee, The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 981-82
(1996).
133. See Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 60, at 899 (arguing that Silicon
Graphics' interpretation was 'untenable"). In response to the veto, some leg-
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is an unreliable and unpersuasive indicator of congressional in-
tent.
b. The Silicon Graphics Interpretation Creates Impermissible
Textual Inconsistency
In concluding that section 21D(b)(2) abolishes liability for
recklessness, the Silicon Graphics court not only overstated the
significance of 21D(b)(2Ys legislative history, it also disregarded
the text of the provision. Congress studiously avoided defining
scienter in section 21D(b)(2) by referring to the "required state of
mind,"" thus deferring the issue of substantive liability to the
judiciary and existing case law.'35 Case law prior to the PSLRA
uniformly upheld recklessness as a form of scienter 36 and the
text of 21D(b)(2) does nothing to alter that standard.
Furthermore, interpreting 21D(b)(2) to abolish liability for
recklessness renders other provisions of the PSLRA irrelevant
or contradictory. In contrast to 21D(b)(2), other parts of the
statute explicitly eliminate liability for recklessness.'37 Section
78u-4(g)(2)(A) provides that joint and several liability can only
be imposed on a person who "knowingly committed" a securities
violation.' The safe harbor provision of the PSLRA imposes li-
ability only on persons with "actual knowledge.""39 The Silicon
Graphics court's interpretation obliterates these distinctions by
requiring knowledge for all securities fraud violations whether
or not the governing provision so provides." This is an unac-
islators argued that the President's fears were unfounded and others admon-
ished the President for quibbling aver details. See 141 CONG. REC. H15219
(daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Lofgren) (arguing that 211)(b)(2)
does not enact a pleading standard higher than the Second Circuit standard);
141 CONG. REc. S19053-54 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(expressing bewilderment over the Presidents attempt to veto the legislation).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1994).
135. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
BLOOMENrHAL ET AL., supra note 21, § 17.03[2][b], at 950 (examining Second
Circuit case law adopting the motive/strong circumstantial evidence guid-
ance).
136. See supra note 36 (citing cases that held recklessness to be an action-
able state of mind).
137. See Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp.
1297, 1309 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2)(A).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i).
140. See Nicholas E. Chimicles, The Future of Securities Litigation Under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in FINANCIAL SERvIcEs




ceptable reading of the statute as a whole, because it renders the
aforementioned provisions redundant.
B. USING MOTVE AND OPPORTUNITYAS A PLEADING TEST Is
UNFAITHFUL TO CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Congress made no effort to redefine substantive liability in
21D(b)(2) because its central focus in enacting the provision was
to unify and strengthen procedural pleading standards.' The
Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test is inconsistent with
this focus and should not be applied under 21D(b)(2). First, the
text of the provision makes no reference to any pleading test as
being sufficient as a matter of law to establish a strong inference
of scienter. Indeed, Congress debated and rejected an effort to in-
clude the motive and opportunity test in the text of 21D(b)(2)."
Furthermore, the motive and opportunity test is inconsistent
with Congress's intent to reduce frivolous litigation, because its
implementation in the Second Circuit is widely acknowledged to
have yielded subjective application and inconsistent results.
Therefore, courts should not interpret section 21D(b)(2) as im-
plicitly codifying the motive and opportunity test.
The Baesa court noted that the text of section 21D(b)(2) con-
tains the Second Circuit's strong inference standard but does not
denote either of the Second Circuit pleading tests as sufficient to
meet this standard.' Thus, the court correctly reasoned, "the
mere pleading of motive and opportunity does not, of itself,
automatically suffice to raise a strong inference of scienter."'"
Since the text of a statute is the best indicator of legislative in-
tent,'45 the omission of motive and opportunity language strongly
indicates that 21D(b)(2) does not allow plaintiffs to survive a
motion to dismiss by merely pleading motive and opportunity.
This interpretation is reinforced by 21D(b)(2)'s legislative
history.' Courts that have implemented the motive and oppor-
141. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the intent be-
hind enacting section 21D(b)(2)).
142. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
143. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534,
543 (1940).
146. The Baesa court declined to examine the legislative history, noting
that "[wlhen the statutory text is so plain, resort to legislative history is nei-
ther necessary nor prudent." 969 F. Supp. at 241. This Note argues that the
Baesa interpretation of 21D(b)(2) is not only textually correct but is also con-
sistent with the provision's legislative history.
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tunity test under 21D(b)(2) have overlooked the fact that Con-
gress, by rejecting the Specter Amendment, made an express
decision not to codify the motive and opportunity test.47 Resolu-
tion of pleading standards was the central focus of 21D(b)(2),'"
and opponents of the amendment expressed reservations about
making any specific test sufficient as a matter of law.'49 Therefore,
the motive and opportunity test should not be employed as an
independent method of creating a strong inference of scienter,
because Congress rejected presumptively sufficient pleading
tests when it rejected the Specter amendment.
Several courts, while ignoring the Specter Amendment,
have relied on the Report of the Senate Banking Committee to
support the continued application of the motive and opportunity
test under 21D(b)(2).'" Although the report stated that courts
may refer to Second Circuit law in applying 21D(b)(2),' 5 this
alone is not inconsistent with the elimination of the motive and
opportunity test. Proponents of 21D(b)(2) stated that the provi-
sion codified the Second Circuit approach only in part." Thus,
Second Circuit law is still relevant to evaluate a pleading in re-
gards to the circumstantial evidence test. The Banking Commit-
tee Report is not authority for using Second Circuit law to exam-
ine pleading of motive and opportunity, however, because the
Statement of the Managers explicitly eliminated that test as an
independent pleading method."i
147. See David C. Mahaffey, Pleading Standards and Discovery Stays Un-
der the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: An End to Fishing Expedi-
tions?, INSIGHTS, Feb. 1996, at 9, 10 (arguing that the Specter Amendment
was rejected because of the leniency of the motive and opportunity test).
148. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S9172 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Bennett) (stating that specific language indicating which facts would
sufficiently prove inference of fraud was deliberately left out); 141 CoNG. REc.
S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (expressing con-
cern over the amendments language).
150. See, e.g., Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (citing to the Senate Banking Committee's report that required the Sec-
ond Circuit's pleading standard); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm.
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1311 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (same).
151. "The Committee does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's caselaw
interpreting this pleading standard, although courts may find this body of law
instructive.- S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995)
152. "Mhe language of the bill does codify the [Slecond [C]ircuit standard
in part." 141 CONG. REC. S19149 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Bradley) (emphasis added).
153. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
1998] 1127
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Courts have also erred by assuming, based on the absence of
explicit congressional language, that the motive and opportunity
test was not preempted by 21D(b)(2). For example, the Marks-
man Partners court reasoned that Congress would have ex-
pressly eliminated the motive and opportunity test in the body of
the statute if they intended to discard it." Utilizing an analogy
to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the court
concluded that "when Congress wishes to supplant a judicially
created rule it knows how to do so explicitly, and in the body of
the statute."'55 Absent such a specific directive, the court as-
sumed the motive and opportunity test was still valid.'56
The Marksman Partners analysis significantly overstates
the doctrinal importance of the motive and opportunity test.
Unlike the Supreme Court precedent Congress attempted to
modify in the RFRA, the motive and opportunity test does not
deserve presumptive validity under section 21D(b)(2) because it
has never been endorsed by the Supreme Court and has been in-
consistently applied even in the Second Circuit." For example,
Second Circuit courts differ as to whether pleading only motive
and opportunity, without other circumstantial evidence of fraud,
is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.'8 Additionally,
courts have split on the issue of what type of motive provides a
strong inference of scienter'59 as well as the issue of how compel-
ling such a motive must be to create the necessary strong infer-
ence. " Given the uncertain status of the motive and opportu-
nity test in the circuit of its origin, it is clearly excessive and
154. See Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1311 (noting that a decision
not to codify was not the equivalent of elimination).
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238,243 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
158. See id. See generally Douglas M. Parker, Fraud Under Section 10(b)
of Securities Exchange Act, N.Y. L.J., April 11, 1994, at 1. The author dis-
cusses the conceptual distinction between pleading motive and opportunity as
a supplement to circumstantial evidence of fraudulent and pleading motive
and opportunity as the sole evidence of fraudulent intent. Id.
159. See Brodsky, supra note 18, at 3. The author contrasts the reasoning
in two Second Circuit cases predating the PSLRA. See id. Compare In re
Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 270 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a
desire to raise capital satisfies the motive prong) with San Leandro Emer-
gency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801, 814
(2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a desire to raise capital does not satisfy the mo-
tive prong).
160. See Brodsky, supra note 18, at 3.
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inappropriate to require specific statutory disapproval to elimi-
nate the test.
IV. THE BAESA STANDARD EFFECTIVELY PROMOTES
THE GOALS OF THE PSLRA
Section 21D(b)(2) is only one component of a broad piece of
legislation which was designed with the broader purpose of cur-
tailing abusive securities litigation without closing the court-
house doors to genuinely aggrieved parties with valid claims.16" '
Examining the purposes of both the PSLRA and the underlying
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, two policy considerations
emerge. First, 10b-5's primary function is to compensate investors
injured by fraud and deter securities fraud through private en-
forcement mechanisms." Second, the PSLRA declares that
frivolous litigation should not be tolerated in pursuit of these
goals.' 6 The Baesa standard, which eliminates motive and oppor-
tunity as an alternative pleading method but retains recklessness
liability, properly reconciles these competing policy interests by
discouraging frivolous suits without undermining the deterrent
and compensation functions of private securities fraud claims.
A. TiE BAESA STANDARD EFFECTIVELY DIFFERENTIATES
BETWEEN FRivoLous AND NONFRIOLoUs CLAhImS BY
ELIMINATING RELIANCE ON MoTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY
The Baesa standard recognizes that motive and opportunity,
unless pled in conjunction with other evidence of scienter, often
do not create the strong inference of scienter necessary to with-
stand a motion to dismiss. A showing of motive and opportunity,
absent a showing that the maker of the statement had some ba-
sis for believing the statement was false at the time it was ut-
tered, provides only an inference that a plaintiff had a reason to
make a false statement.'" It does not create an inference that
16L See Rehm v. Eagle Finance Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (N.D. EL.
1997).
162. See supra note 27.
163. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995).
164. The tenuous relationship between the existence of a motive and the
actual commission of fraudulent activity was discussed by D. Brian Hufford:
IT]here is no reason to believe that for individual defendants, making
themselves and their company look good by increasing stock prices is
not a sufficient motive for securities fraud, even if defendants do not
sell their stock and thereby directly profit from the fraud. In fact,
there is no reason to believe that a defendant must always have a ra-
tional reason for committing fraud. It might well be that a defendant
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the defendant knew at the time of the statement that it was
false.16 This fundamental weakness makes the motive and op-
portunity test inappropriate as an independent method of
pleading scienter, particularly in view of Congress's clear intent
to strengthen pleading standards.
Under the motive and opportunity test, opportunity exists
any time an individual is in a position in which he could issue
the alleged misinformation." Plaintiffs can satisfy the oppor-
tunity prong simply by naming the individuals controlling the
company, such as the officers and directors, in the complaint."
As a result, the opportunity prong is rarely even a point of con-
tention in 10b-5 litigation.16' Certainly, it offers defendants no
protection from frivolous claims.
The motive prong is also poorly suited to 21D(b)(2)'s gate-
keeping function. Methods of pleading motive generally fall into
two categories.'69 First, plaintiffs may allege that a false state-
ment was made in order to prevent hostile takeovers, raise capital,
retain executive positions, or to obtain performance-based bo-
nuses.170 Second, a plaintiff may allege that a false statement
was made by a corporate insider in order to maximize the profits
of her stock sales due to the favorable market reaction to the op-
timistic statement. 7' Both approaches suffer significant weak-
nesses.
simply took steps which defrauded the public for completely irra-
tional or personal reasons that are not easily articulated or evaluated
in monetary terms. That does not mean that the actions in question
are any less fraudulent or that the defendant should be any less li-
able under the securities laws.
Hufford, supra note 13, at 623-624. "At best, the requirement imposed on
plaintiffs to allege motive leads to creative lawyering in which the plaintiffs
try to articulate all the many possible reasons the defendant may have had for
committing fraud.. . ." Id at 624.
165. See BLOOMENTHAL ETAL., supra note 21, § 17.03[2[c], at 953.
166. See Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1173-74 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
that allegations of defendants' status as officers, directors, and majority
shareholders constituted "opportunity").
167. See Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 927
F. Supp. 1297, 1312 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
168. See id. The court discusses opportunity in one paragraph, concluding
that "W[t]here is no question about Chantal and Burnison's 'opportunity' to
carry out the means." Id.
169. See BLOOMENTHALETAL., supra note 21, § 17.0312][al-Ecl, at 949-55.
170. See id- § 17.03[2][b], at 950 (discussing Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp,
Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994)).
171 See id. § 17.03[21[c], at 953.
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Pleading retention of executive position or desire to obtain
bonuses as a motive to commit fraud is insufficient to create a
strong inference of scienter. These motives are generic since
they would be applicable to most corporations and executives in
the United States." Moreover, there are typically countervail-
ing motives not to commit fraud, such as the illegality of securi-
ties fraud and the damage to reputation which such fraud in-
curs." These factors mitigate the strength of the inferences
which can be drawn from allegations of generic motives."
Plaintiffs also commonly plead insider trading as a basis for
inferring scienter." The existence of insider trading alone is
also generally insufficient to establish a strong inference of sci-
enter. First, alleging that a defendant sold stock in anticipation
of forthcoming bad news does not necessarily indicate that pre-
vious optimistic statements were known to be false at the time
they were made.76 An insider could issue an optimistic state-
ment with complete belief in its truth, only to find that subse-
quent unexpected circumstances render it incorrect, and then
decide to exercise stock options.'" While this activity would be
proscribed by insider trading statutes, it does not form the basis
of a 10b-5 claim because the insider did not issue the statement
with the requisite intent.'
Second, accepting insider trading activities as evidence of
fraud is vastly overinclusive because stock options have become
a routine form of executive compensation.79 In an effort to at-
tract managerial talent, many young companies pay a substantial
172. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir.
1994). In fact, most pre-PSLRA decisions rejected generic motives under the
motive and opportunity test. See, e.g., San Leandro Emergency Med. Group
Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801, 815 (2d Cir. 1996); Acito
v. Imcera Group Inc., 47 F.3d 47,47 (2d Cir. 1995). But see In re Time Warner
Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 259 (2d Cir. 1993) (reversing dismissal of claim
and observing that "it was arguable that corporate principals acted in belief
that they could reduce degree of dilution caused by alternative stock offering
by artificially enhancing price of stock by way of announced goal of seeking
strategic alliances"); In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 922 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that company executives' desire to receive more compensation
satisfied the motive requirement of the motive and opportunity test).
173. See BLooMENTHAL ET AL., supra note 21, § 17.03[2][b], at 951-52.
174. See id.
175. See Eth & Dicke, supra note 9, at 107.
176. See BLOOMENTHAL ET AL., supra note 21, § 17.03[2][c], at 953.
177. See id. at 954.
178. See id. at 954-55.
179. See Eth & Dicke, supra note 9, at 97.
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portion of their executive compensation through such options.' 0
Such options are often exercised on a regular basis. 8' Moreover,
insider stock sales are a matter of public record." Therefore, the
common use of insider stock sales as evidence of scienter is at-
tributable primarily to the availability of such information
rather than to its probative force regarding a defendant's state of
mind.
B. ELIMINATION OF THE MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY STANDARD
DOES NOT CAUSE UNDERENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES LAW
Consumer protection groups contend that any measure that
reduces the number of claims litigated necessarily erodes the re-
liability of securities markets." The SEC has limited resources
with which to enforce securities regulations and relies on private
causes of action as a supplemental enforcement measure.'" It is
argued, therefore, that elimination of the motive and opportu-
nity test will result in underenforcement of securities regula-
tions, allowing corporate misconduct to go unaddressed.'5 Con-
sumer interest groups argue that this outcome contradicts the
mandate of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and works to the
detriment of individual investors as well as the market as a
whole.' 8
6
This argument misconstrues the purpose of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and disregards the negative secondary ef-
fects the proliferation of securities fraud litigation has created.
The purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and indeed
securities regulation as a whole, is to "provide full and fair dis-
180. See id. at 107.
181 See id.
182. See id. at 108.
183. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (statement of
Leonard B. Simon, attorney), available in 1997 WL 11235199. Mr. Simon ar-
gues that federal protections should be enhanced in light of increased individ-
ual participation in the stock market. See id. "[A]ny... diminution of inves-
tor protections... runs the extremely significant risk of leaving
investors... without a-n-y protection against fraud... [Tihe consequences of
such a result would go far beyond blocking the recovery of investor losses, and
touch upon the integrity and vitality of the capital formation mechanism it-
self." Id.
184. See Hufford, supra note 13, at 638.
185. See supra note 183.
186. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (statement of Leonard B.
Simon, attorney), available in 1997 WL 11235199.
1132 [Vol. 82:1103
PLEADING SCIENTER
closure" with regard to securities and "to prevent inequitable
and unfair practices" in our nation's markets.' Since the motive
and opportunity test is an unreliable indicator of fraud, its util-
ity in deterring unfair securities practices is nominal.''
Eliminating use of the motive and opportunity test does not
disserve the private enforcement function of 10b-5 actions.
While the increased difficulty of pleading scienter without utiliz-
ing the motive and opportunity test may result in fewer claims
filed, plaintiffs who are dissuaded by 21D(b)(2)'s stringency are
precisely the litigants the PSLRA was enacted to deter.'89 Plain-
tiffs with valid claims should not find it unduly burdensome to
plead at least a minimal number of facts in support of their con-
tentions. Moreover, marginal claims have unacceptable adverse
impacts which work to the detriment of both corporations and
investors." A targeted company spends an average of $700,000
dollars in legal fees and 1,000 hours of management time de-
fending a lawsuit that almost always results in settlement.""
The average settlement in a securities fraud claim is $8.6 million
dollars," a figure that often bears little relationship to the merits
of the lawsuit.93 This financial burden is imposed on fraudulent
and innocent companies alike as long as the lawsuit survives the
pleadings stage.
Besides the financial impact on targeted corporations, the
fear of strike suits has negatively impacted corporate govern-
ance. For example, some companies have significantly steril-
ized their prospectuses for the purpose of excluding informa-
tion that is concrete enough to be used against them in future
187. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975)
(quoting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, codified as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.).
188. Cf. Moses & Jeck, supra note 10, at 33 (discussing the shortcomings of
the pre-PSLRA securities laws). "[Any system that penalizes innocent and
guilty actors indiscriminately cannot effectively deter fraud, nor fairly com-
pensate the victims of fraud." Id
189. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.CA.N. 730. The Committee stated that "[t]he private securities litiga-
tion system is too important to the integrity of American capital markets to
allow this system to be undermined by those who seek to line their own pock-
ets by bringing abusive and meritless suits." Id.
190. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11 (1995) (statements of Sen. D'Amato)
(arguing that securities fraud litigation impedes capitalization and imposes a
litigation tax on businesses).
19L See Donovan, supra note 1, at 6.
192. See id.
193. See Moses, supra note 8, at 37.
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litigation."u Additionally, the specter of securities fraud litiga-
tion has made it difficult to recruit directors and outside pro-
fessional services, who are reluctant to risk liability without
adequate insurance."'5 The net result of frivolous securities
fraud litigation is an impediment to corporate growth and a re-
duction in the amount of investment information, both of which
harm investors.9
Finally, private securities litigation nominally rewards a
small group of investors to the detriment of the investment
community as a whole." Although the amount of a settlement
may be quite large, law firms typically extract a sizable sum
and the plaintiffs get "pennies on the dollar from these settle-
ments."'98 A securities fraud lawsuit also shifts losses to cur-
rent shareholders, since the company is forced to bear the costs
of defending the suit." To the extent that such lawsuits com-
pel even innocent corporations to insure themselves against
the risk of lawsuits, they also reduce overall profitability and
impairs stock value."s
194 See Eth & Dicke, supra note 9, at 99 (discussing increased corporate
awareness of public statements' future utility in litigation).
195. See Thompson, supra note 3.
196. See Steven B. Rosenfeld, "Immateriality As a Matter of Law": An Ef-
fective Curb on Securities Fraud Litigation, REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG.,
October 11, 1995, at 169; see also 1215/95 Gov't Press Releases (statement of
Sen. Orrin Hatch), available in 1995 WL 13342042.
197. See BLOOMENTHAL ET AL., supra note 21, § 17.01[21, at 938 ("[O]ne of
the flaws in the Securities Acts scheme of private remedies is the fact that, to
the extent the action has merit, the real culprits seldom pay for sins."). The
Court in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver also rec-
ognized this fact, noting that "the increased costs incurred by professionals
because of the litigation and settlement costs under 10b-5 may be passed on to
their client companies, and in turn incurred by the company's investors, the
intended beneficiaries of the statute." 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1454 (1994) (citing
Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 948-66
(1993)).
198. See INFORMATION ACCESS CO. AND APT DATA SERVICES, American
Electronics Association Wages War on Class Action Lawsuits, COMPUTERGRAM
INT'L, July 25, 1994; 141 CONG. REC. S19037-02, S19043 (daily ed. Dec. 21,
1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (estimating that investors receive 14 cents
per dollar of damages).
199. See 141 CONG. REC. S19037-02, S19043 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995)
(statements of Sen. Domenici); 141 CONG. REC. S19034-01, S19035 (daily ed.
Dec. 21, 1995) (statements of Sen. Bennett) ("[Tihe owners of corporations are
investors, and anything which damages the economic health of the corpora-
tion damages the investors who place their money in that corporation.");
Avery, supra note 71, at 338-39.
200. See 141 CONG. REC. S19083-03, S19084 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995)
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C. THE BAESA STANDARD PROPERLY RECONCILES THE PoLICIEs
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT AND THE PSLRA BY
RETAINING LIABILITY FOR RECKLESS MISSTATEMENTS
While employing the motive and opportunity test fails to
further the PSLRA's interest in reducing abusive securities liti-
gation, eliminating liability for recklessness would overzealously
reduce nonmeritorious securities fraud claims at the expense of
a significant number of meritorious complaints. Federal courts
that have abrogated liability for recklessness not only contra-
dicted Congress's intent, but also failed to consider the practical
consequences of their decisions. The required showing of knowl-
edge or intent to prove scienter has a two-fold impact: first, it
would allow morally culpable actors to successfully perpetrate
fraudulent activity; and second, it would contribute to an in-
crease in irresponsible corporate management practices.
1. Recognizing the Culpability of Reckless Misstatements
Recklessness, as defined in securities law, connotes a bad
faith decision which harms investors.0' This bad faith can take
many form: an investor may be reckless by lacking belief in a
statement's truth, by deliberately avoiding information about a
statement's truth, or by knowing that the statement was made
on the basis of insufficient information. In each instance, the
declarant knows that the statement may not be true but decides
to make it nonetheless. Thus, recklessness, though not requir-
ing actual knowledge of falsity, requires the same conscious de-
cision as intent. Since the same culpability and social harm
are present whether a defendant is reckless or knowledgeable,
reckless actors should not be insulated from liability.
2. Encouraging Responsible Corporate Governance
The Baesa standard, which retains liability for recklessness,
reflects the belief that maintaining liability for recklessness is
(statements of Sen. Reid) (discussing the impact of frivolous litigation on in-
surance costs); cf Paul Beckett, 2?eckless Misconduct" Standard Debated In
Lawsuits by Investors Alleging Fraud, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1997, at A7 (noting
that heightened pleading standards could lower insurance costs).
201 See Kuehnle, supra note 15, at 190-91.
202. See id. at 188-96.
203. See, e.g., id. at 189 (noting that a defendant would possess scienter
"where the defendant did not actually know the statement was false, but did
not affirmatively believe it was true when he uttered it").
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vital to preserving the integrity of the securities markets.' Li-
ability for recklessness promotes responsible corporate govern-
ance because it encourages corporate management to actively
investigate the factual assertions contained in public releases. 5
In fact, abolition of liability for recklessness creates a dangerous
disincentive for corporate officers to avoid investigating in-
stances of potential misconduct.2  To avoid individual liability
for disseminating materially false statements, an officer could
simply refrain from inquiring into the veracity of the state-
ment.2 7 This practice would diminish the reliability of invest-
ment information,2 8 the precise result the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 was enacted to prevent.
CONCLUSION
Section 21D(b)(2) was enacted to promulgate a uniform and
heightened pleading standard, but misinterpretation by the ju-
diciary has frustrated both purposes. The divisive splits among
circuits have continued as courts struggle with the provision's
meaning, undermining the national uniformity desired by Con-
gress. Moreover, courts' application of the Second Circuit's mo-
tive and opportunity test under section 21D(b)(2) impedes the
PSLRA's goal of reducing frivolous securities fraud litigation.
Resolution is necessary to protect genuinely aggrieved investors
and at the same time address the negative effects of strike suits.
Courts should not allow securities fraud plaintiffs to plead a
strong inference of scienter by merely pleading motive and op-
portunity. Congress recognized that the test is often not inde-
pendently sufficient to create a strong inference of scienter, and
appropriately declined to codify the test in 21D(b)(2). However,
the congressional intent to reduce securities fraud litigation
should not be misconstrued by the judiciary as a license to alter
the well-established substantive jurisprudence of Rule 10b-5.
Section 21D(b)(2) addresses only the procedural issue of pleading
204. See H.R. REP. No. 104-50, pt. I, at 104. "[Vlirtually all experts in the
field of securities law believe that liability for recklessness is critical if the
antifraud laws are to successfully deter fraudulent activity in the market."
Id.; see also H.R. 10 Hearings, supra note 54, at 193 (1995) (statement of Ar-
thur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
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standards, and courts should acknowledge the limited scope of
the provision by retaining liability for reckless misstatements.
Liability for recklessness is vital to both the deterrence and
compensation functions of America's securities laws, and insures
that defrauded investors will have their day in court.

